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Soon after I moved into his home in November 2004, I began to consider
Antonio a good friend. But late one night in February, during one of his long
after-dinner monologues about the various injustices his people suffered, he asked
a question that would redefine our relationship. He had been telling me the story
of a friend who, while working for a nearby soybean farmer, had contracted a
mysterious illness that had made him suddenly swell up and die. Upset by the
story, he launched into a rant about soybeans until he was almost shouting above
the din of rain on the roof. “You come back in two or three years,” Antonio said.
“We’re all going to be dead. All of the children are going to die. There’s no future
left for us. It’s the soybeans that are killing us.” He went on for some time like
this, telling similar stories about soybeans and death, and I realized, with some
discomfort, that he really meant it. Then, after a brief hesitation, he turned to
me and asked, “What do you think of what I just said?” I had a lot more difficulty
responding to this question than I like to admit.
At the time, I was researching peasant activism along the conflictive eastern
edge of Paraguay’s quickly expanding soybean frontier, and Antonio was a local
leader in the movement. The sorts of smallholders that followed Antonio did not
plant soybeans, a new crop that required significant capital and was associated with
wealthier Brazilian migrants entering the area from the east. But the beans were
everywhere, and they were transforming the landscape and economy around them.
Because I had conceptualized my project around politics and property, I hadn’t
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worked out a response to their overwhelming leafy presence. But they never really
got under my skin until that night in February, when my response to the beans
became inextricably entangled with my responses to Antonio.
I can’t remember if I answered his question that night. But the conversation
repeated itself many times over the following months, with Antonio and others,
and I eventually began to give a standard, tepid answer: the real problem lay in a
new agrarian structure developing in rural Paraguay, and the beans were merely
incidental, easily replaced by something else, like canola or corn. This answer was
not based on evidence or knowledge but on an allegory of agrarian transitions
with which I was familiar. Nonetheless it was expressed as expertise, because the
question seemed to interpellate me as an expert, as someone asked to give an
authoritative opinion about the relationship between someone else’s interpretation
of the world and the world as I knew it. Only much later did I understand
Antonio’s hesitation as an invitation: he was not fact-checking but was inviting me
to participate in the construction of what would turn out to be a very powerful fact.
The stakes of this difference became clearer to me two weeks later when I had
trouble responding again, this time to Andre´s, a business consultant whom I knew
through wealthy friends in Asuncio´n. Andre´s had always been suspicious of my
political proclivities and of my motivations for doing research in his country. That
night, before dinner at the friend’s house, Andre´s was reading a newspaper article
about a recent campesino (peasant) protest against soybean cultivation. Addressing
me gruffly, he proclaimed, “So now your campesinos are afraid of soy!” I had
argued with him over the structural causes of rural poverty before, but on this clear
challenge to my sympathies, I was unable to respond adequately. Antonio’s dire
predictions of course came to mind, but I didn’t want to share them.
In both of these encounters, the bean presented itself as a curious thing
mediating (and potentially reinforcing) a hierarchy of knowledge practices. As I
show, it is hard to dispute the correlation between the presence of soybeans in
Paraguay and the decline of campesino life on the frontier. Even Andre´s could have
agreed with that point. But Antonio and others insisted not on correlation but on
an explanation of cause and responsibility that violated the tacit ontological rules of
a world of human agents and their instruments. They insisted that beans were not
merely instruments of human agency or of structural forces but excessive things
with a force of their own. And they made this argument earnestly, not only in
words but also by attacking soybeans with fire and machetes and scrawling “soy
kills” on banners and courthouses. Here they crossed a line that allowed Andre´s to
disqualify them altogether from the discussion about how to organize Paraguayan
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affairs. In other words, both Andre´s and Antonio were asking me to play a part
in the triangle in which Paraguayans asserted their modernity vis-a`-vis each other
by adopting an appropriate relationship with beans. Any analytic response to
either question would also already be a political response in a fraught landscape of
accusations that at the time I could sense only dimly.
Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with
and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio
said about them. Which meant that it wasn’t much of a conversation with humans
either. To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at
him. I instinctively translated his statements about the nature of beans into social
phenomena: I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of
political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which
explicitly framed “la soja mata” (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than
analysis itself worthy of response.
The fact that I did not believe that soybeans kill did not entirely prevent
me from participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices. I was often called on
to photograph the negative effects he attributed to beans: dead birds, pustules
on babies, abandoned schools, dead crops, burned houses. I didn’t sign on to his
interpretations of the pictures.Were those birds by the riverbank really poisoned by
glyphosate herbicide? Was that kid born without a brain because the neighbor was
using a crop duster? And if they were, were beans responsible for these harms? In the
absence of laboratory tests (which were impossible to access) or reliable medical
opinions (which were always cursory and patronizing), I avoided these questions
altogether. It wasn’t until June 2005, when I took pictures of two men being shot
to death by soy farmers for protesting the soy harvest, that my skepticism was
shaken. I became part of the situation, and despite my inability to find intellectual
purchase on the beans, I felt compelled to respond more forcefully.
At first, I responded in newspapers, on the radio, and on a number of activist
blogs that proliferated around soybeans in 2005. Most of all, though, I responded
in court and in a variety of ways that were meant to influence the murder trial that
followed the shootings. In this way, I became part of the story that I am about to
tell. Although Antonio may have wanted me to lend ethnographic authority to the
proposition that beans kill, his greater ambition was to have them affirmed as a legal
fact, to enroll the SupremeCourt of Paraguay in a process of assigning responsibility
for soy’s harms, thereby redressing them. And he was partially successful. In the
months and years following these conversations, the presence of killer beans was
felt by a much broader swath of Paraguayan society, largely through the efforts of
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Antonio and his allies, including, inevitably, myself. This is the story, then, of how
Paraguay’s killer beans moved from being campesino misunderstandings to matters
of national concern. If, as Bruno Latour asserts (1999), facts are produced by “trials
of force” inside and outside the laboratory, then this is the story of a different but
analogous sort of trial inside and outside the courtroom, which reshaped Paraguay’s
political territory so that beans might be taken seriously.
MODERN TERRITORY
Not surprisingly, this confrontation over the status of beans occurred on
territory that had been subjected to repeated attempts at modernization and col-
onization over the past century. Most of the communities in which soybeans are
now a threat were built during the late 1960s and 1970s as part of a land re-
form that promised campesinos full political inclusion and economic opportunity
in return for desperately hard work in what were then thick forests, inhabited
by disparate enclaves of indigenous people and foreign pioneers (see Kleinpenning
1987; Pastore 1972). The project explicitly proposed to turn campesinos intomod-
ern subjects by enrolling them in export-oriented cotton production and having
them objectify the land as property (see, e.g., Frutos 1982). Eastern Paraguay was
transformed during this period into a modern landscape of roads, tamer animals,
and self-interested individuals (Domı´nguez 1975). But it was also modernized in
the sense that it became a territory where knowledge practices are captured by
categories of difference (Stengers 2008) arranged in a hierarchical and temporal
order: indigenous people represented the past, foreigners and elites represented
the future, and campesinos struggled to be included in the present (Hetherington
2011).
Perhaps the most striking symptom of this transition is what happened to a
host of other creatures who crossed a line from threatening presence into myth and
then all but disappeared. Campesino life once included frequent contact with a host
of spirit creatures, from the cunning, diminutive pombero to luiso˜, the corpse-eating
werewolf, but these creatures had begun to disappear in the previous two decades.
Older residents of the frontier often lumped these creatures with Guayakı´ hunter-
gatherers and large forest mammals, and said that they had slowly disappeared
“deeper” into the receding forest as the frontier matured. Younger men, however,
argued about whether these creatures existed at all or were “just myths.” The
mythologization was formalized during the 1990s, when the national education
system was overhauled by a major World Bank project. The new curriculum
included teaching the Guaranı´ language and classes about cultural heritage that
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prominently featured these creatures as tokens of Paraguay’s cultural past. By
2005, the argument that these were just myths was winning out, and certainly
Antonio had nothing but amiable dismissal for those who continued to believe in
such things, staking his political project and self-representation on the grounds of
a firmly modernist ontology.
Thus, the campesino movement that now “fears beans” was forged by young
men hewing trees, chasing Indians, and ditching superstitions in return for recogni-
tion from a modernizing government. Men like Antonio are hardscrabble frontier
individualists deeply suspicious of anything that smells of animism. He has always
tried to fight the Paraguayan elite on modern territory: he clearly does not want
killer beans to be relegated to the same category as the pombero, who lives comfort-
ably on modern territory as a quaint tradition but not as a political force. Given
this, then, Antonio’s turn to killer beans is a careful one, and that makes it all the
more pressing to ask the questions: Why is it necessary for him to explain things
in this way? Why is it necessary to blur the ontological convention of established
political contest by invoking the responsibility of beans, when he knows this will
open him up to dismissal?
To answer, I had to stop asking what kind of things killer beans were and start
asking under what situations and with what kinds of knowledge practices they were
constituted. I have found it helpful to compare soy to a less contentious though
otherwise similar entity: cotton. The campesino frontier was built primarily on
smallholder cotton production, but the crop has been in decline since the 1980s
(Baer and Birch 1984). In 2005, the cotton crop around Vaquerı´a, where Antonio
lives, failed spectacularly because of drought and low prices, and most campesinos
I knew vowed to stop planting from then on. Some still managed to get a fair return
from their plots, however, and I asked one of these farmers, Ortega, how he had
managed to save his crop from the usual onslaught of pests that accompanied the
drought. He told me that his success was about being aware of the needs of his
crop at all times. Late at night, Ortega told me, he could hear his cotton crying
(hase˜), and he was unable to sleep. The cry demanded a response, but he lay there
helplessly waiting for the sun to come up so that he could strap on his pesticide pack
and go tend to the problem. Here the cotton cries for a specific kind of aid on which
both Ortega and the cotton have depended for years, but that is never entirely
predictable. For when Ortega goes to bed the following night, he will continue
to listen, to know cotton’s response to his own ministrations. The ability of both
Ortega and his cotton plants to respond to each other (their “response-ability”) may
decide whether either of them is here next year (cf. Haraway 2008).
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Two things about this story are worth noting. The first is that the cotton’s cries
are constructed through practices of pragmatic intervention in the world, rather
than reflection on it. This is the same difference that Ian Hacking (1983) uses to
describe scientific experimentation: the real is grasped not through representation
but through effective interventions. ForOrtega it is a completelymisplacedquestion
to ask whether cotton is really crying. He has no theory of crying cotton, and no
need for one; all he knows is that he has to respond. Responsibility for the cotton’s
distress is distributed through a number of possible conditions, some of which he
can affect and some of which he cannot: the drought, the actions of his neighbors,
his own previous uses of the soil, whether he is using the right pesticide or if the
label on the bottle is even correct, or whether the seeds he bought were bad to
begin with. As he lies awake at night, he tries to figure out his place in this scenario
in the hopes that he might intervene effectively. This may include buying more
pesticide, confronting the seed vendor, or joining a march for subsidies. Each of
these actions enrolls a certain network of responsibility and elicits new sorts of
responses.
Second, a key difference between crying cotton and killer soy is that the
former is a proposition that circulates in a smaller network than the latter. That
is, crying cotton is a decidedly local phenomenon, and its robustness is connected
to its scale (see Law 2011). It is the sort of knowledge that Ortega needs to be a
good cotton farmer in his region of eastern Paraguay; he may call on neighbors or
family members to help in his interventions, and they will not question the cotton’s
cries. At most, he might march and ask for subsidies in the form of credit relief,
but these are usually framed in populist terms and do not turn on the question
of responsibility. Because no one outside of the situation cares about how Ortega
relates to cotton, the cotton’s cries do not need to conform to any ontological
premises that operate outside of local interventions.
It is not a stretch to describe all of agriculture as this kind of communicative
waiting game among people, animals, machinery, plants, and weather. Growing
crops is about interactions in which each action can be vaguely directed but is always
already too implicated in complex processes to have predictable effects. Instead,
they elicit responses that cannot be known ahead of time, and it is this mutual
responsiveness (what Karen Barad [2007] calls “intra-action”) that constitutes them
as actors. This is a view of agriculture and knowledge that is not burdened by
ontologically stable objects or properties.1 Unlike concepts such as “agency,” which
connote a stable property (Keane 1997; Laidlaw 2010)2 and are therefore open to
accusations of misattribution, response is not something one is or has but something
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one does in a given situation. It follows that responsibility is less a characteristic of
people than a form of description that one offers of the relationships between
different actors in an event whose causal sequences are not merely mechanical.
From the 1960s onward, campesinos and cotton plants existed as they did
in Paraguay because of a certain responsive relationship with each other, with
chemicals and bugs, neighbors and middlemen. As these relationships started to
disintegrate in the 1990s, as cotton prices stopped rebounding at the end of the
season, as a boll weevil infestation demanded new chemical responses, as rainfall
diminished in response to deforestation, as soybeans pushed up land prices, and
as the Paraguayan government stopped responding to campesino demonstrations,
cotton not only began to degrade in quality and finally disappear from the landscape
but also campesinos suffered crises of confidence in themselves as campesinos. The
particular assemblage of smallholders, cotton, and state building was constructed
of tenuous interactions with multiple actors constituting each other in a dialogue
of responses. In the same way, now, the soybean frontier quickly articulated
itself through a series of coordinated responses involving an even wider and more
recalcitrant array of forces. From this point of view, Antonio’s hesitant question
to me was itself a response to a change in agricultural conditions that became
contentious only to the extent that it began to circulate at a larger scale and tried
to enroll practitioners beyond the local knowledge circles.
It follows, then, that any ethnography about the situation is similarly bound
up with the agricultural and political conditions to which it refers, particularly with
the project of rescaling, because it invites responses of its own in a new public
and distributes responsibility in a slightly new way that may or may not coordinate
easily withwhat campesinos say. That is, it invites us to think not only about analysis
as response (e.g., Riles 2006) but also about the responsibility that we may take
on as ethnographers for the circumstances we describe. For Karen Barad (2007),
this is an ethic of representation that understands all knowledge creation as a form
of intra-action with the things being analyzed,3 that understands the postulates of
any analytic work as responding to elements of the world we have encountered in
investigation, and in so doing elicits new responses.
This is where I am inspired by Isabelle Stengers’s (2008, 2010b) call for
scholars to avoid modern knowledge practices that participate in the capture
of errant knowledge practices. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari,
Stengers sees things like killer beans as potential “lines of flight” from modern
territory (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). An ethnography in response to Antonio can
be formulated in one of two ways. On the one hand, it can do what I initially did:
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participate in reestablishing the priority of frames of reference by disqualifying the
talk of killer beans as, at best, a figure of speech not meant to be taken literally or,
at worst, a mistaken reading of the situation caused by a restricted understanding
of what was going on (what Andre´s would call “ignorance”). On the other hand,
it can itself be formulated very much from within the situation, as a proposition
addressed to campesinos as the creators of killer beans.
Such a proposition, while affirming the singularity of their practice as being
creative, with no obligation to the great narrative that contrasts myth and
reason, is not limited to ratifying what they insist on seeing recognized. It
is an active proposition that can involve them in sorting out whatever it is
they claim, and especially to consider superfluous the claim to the power of
disqualification. [Stengers 2010a:23]
It is therefore appropriate that the response I offer here, the proposition I am
formulating after so much hesitation of my own, did not initially present itself in
representational form but, rather, as situated interventions that arise from both
conversations with campesinos and much exposure to soybeans.
AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF BEANS
Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that
gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar,
even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to
start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate,
recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon,
could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their
homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs. The old roads we took
between communities, now passing through vast fields, began to feel desolate,
and I feared our motorcycles breaking down there far more than in the forest.
Eventually, I came to despise the glower of soy farmers driving their tractors down
the road, to stay inside when I was woken up by the halogen lights of the harvesters
shining in through the boards of our house, and to steer clear of the 18-wheelers,
scattering soybeans into the ditches as they headed for the highway. In one of
my last interviews with a soybean farmer in Vaquerı´a, when I asked what people
thought of Antonio, I was told that they were just waiting for someone to put up
the “twenty-five hundred,” an allusion to the price of a bullet. And still it wasn’t
until I saw someone try to shoot Antonio, narrowly missing him but killing two
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of his friends, that I started to feel directly under threat when around Paraguayan
soybeans.
Soy has been around for millennia, but what made it into one of the world’s
most dominant crops in the 20th century was its simultaneous usefulness as a
rotation crop for wheat and maize and its complexity as an industrial raw material.
Soy was a darling of modernization projects in the United States in the 1920s and
in Brazil and Argentina soon after. In these countries, soybeans were always a cash
crop dependent on industrial inputs and processing capacity (de Sousa et al. 2008).
Paraguay, landlocked and conflictive, and with very little industry well into the
1970s, put its development emphasis instead into cotton, a more appropriate crop
for smallholders with few tools. Even in the late 1970s, when Brazilian migrants
began to plant soy in the eastern border regions of Paraguay, they did so as part of
a separate national economy and regulatory apparatus, using varieties and buying
inputs developed in Brazil, asking Brazilian extensionists for advice, and selling
their products to the Brazilian market (see Souchaud 2002).
The breakthrough in Paraguay did not come until the introduction of Roundup
Ready Soybeans (RR), a genetically modified variety created by Monsanto in the
mid-1990s. In Paraguay it had several advantages that made it especially dan-
gerous: at the time it was still illegal to plant genetically modified organisms
in Brazil, and so the cheaper RR soy produced in Paraguay was in high de-
mand in the enormous regional market into which it was fed clandestinely. In
practice, the sector was unregulated and untaxed, meaning it was also cheaper
than its Argentine competitors. And unlike those two countries, where RR soy
had less room to expand, in Paraguay the failing cotton economy was ripe for
takeover. As cotton and its markets had declined, much of the state agricul-
tural extension work had been replaced by haphazard NGO-financed diversifica-
tion projects, disarticulating many communities from traditional patronage net-
works and isolating them from government. When RR soy appeared, giving soy
farmers much greater returns and demanding much less labor,4 they exploded
out from the border region into the declining campesino landscape and soon
dominated it.
Although the beans came from Argentina, they were carried by Brazilian
colonists on the Paraguayan frontier, named Brasiguaios, who were themselves de-
scendants of German immigrants, proud of a farming tradition that cherished hard,
round-the-clock work, technical mastery, mechanical intensity, and high-quality
production (Souchaud 2002; Wagner 1990). Soybeans domesticated Brasiguaios
in a way that they probably could not have domesticated campesinos (cf. Tsing
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n.d.). Campesinos saw the long hours and chemical dependency of soy agricul-
ture as a form of servitude, and they avoided becoming enrolled, except as casual
laborers. In those early years, many campesinos operated as though the frontier
was still moving. Seeing their cotton declining and a wave of foreigners moving in
with heavy equipment, they sold their plots to Brazilian speculators and went in
search of new land. As a result, soy advanced extremely quickly, consuming the
remaining space on the frontier, concentrating the eastern regions into larger and
larger farms, and finally pushing land prices beyond the reach of anyone outside the
sector.
By 2004, this tiny landlocked country with no industry to speak of was the
world’s fourth largest producer of industrial soybeans. They blanketed 200- to
300-thousand new hectares per year. If in the main cities of the country the new
crisis was an increase in peripheral slums, for those who stayed in the countryside
it was the dramatic and sudden disappearance of forests, schools, fish, and jobs.
Rural employment plummeted so dramatically that between 2003 and 2005 day
wages for agricultural labor dropped from 15,000 to 8,000 Guaranies (from about
$2.50 to $1.30). Around Vaquer´ıa, whole towns had literally vanished in a matter
of years (Fogel and Riquelme 2005).
In the assemblage that coalesces around soybeans in Paraguay, there are clearly
a lot of actors who bear some responsibility for the coordinated attack on campesino
lives and livelihoods that took place in the 1990s and 2000s. But none by themselves
encompass the enormity of what campesinos mean when they say soy kills. In the
middle of this network is that nagging thing, not an object or instrument of some
malevolent agency, but a thing that exceeds such explanations (Bennett 2010).
And it is appropriate to formulate answers to the campesino crisis that address
themselves to that thing and its responsibility. In fact, though campesinos were
the only ones who said this explicitly at the beginning, once my ethnographic ear
was attuned to the question of responsibility, it was easy to hear that many others
implicitly attributed responsibility to beans as well.
For instance, most of the Braziguaios with whom I spoke were relatively small
producers, owners of 20 to 100 hectares, who had themselves been displaced by
land concentration closer to the Brazilian border. They argued that they had no
choice about planting soy—that in the climate created by beans their only other
choice was the sort of poverty that they saw in campesino communities. And even
this choice was made under duress. The structure of debt in Brasiguaio commu-
nities, centered on heavy equipment, agrichemicals, and fuel, made them deeply
dependent on the owners of grain silos who fronted not only seed and equipment
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but also cash for land acquisitions or takeovers. Campesinos were sympathetic to
this reading, telling me that soybeans enslaved Brasiguaios, turned them violent,
and eventually killed them as well (“la soja brasilerojukaha”). Antagonism launched
against Brasiguaios (and there was plenty of this, often of an overtly xenophobic
variety) was always against a collective that involved beans, because most would
say that there had been few problems between them before soy.
Government regulators, without the funding or the technical know-how to
control the beans’ spread, ducked responsibility as well. For the first five years that
RR soy was in Paraguay, it was banned by an executive decree with considerable
internal support from the Ministry of Agriculture. But government officials never
even considered how they might regulate the beans that were already distributed
throughout the eastern region and were well-known to be imported in unmarked
“white bags.”5 Top tiers of the Ministry of Agriculture took to calling RR soybeans
“soja Maradona” after the famous Argentine football player who could wind his
way through any defense and even won a World Cup by breaking the rules (Robin
2008:276). By 2004, soybeans accounted for 11 percent of the country’s GDP, and
it was hard to imagine what would happen to the economy if a major step was taken
to limit production, evenwhile they pushed up exchange rates and unemployment.6
EvenMonsanto managed to successfully argue its own victimhood at the beginning,
given the lack of patent protection or legal approval in Paraguay, and the fact
that the beans flowed through a black market that generated no revenue for the
country.
The difference between these attributions of responsibility and those of
campesinos is that they came from the kinds of voices whose rationality is rarely in
question—who may in fact define rationality of the kind Andre´s values—because
they do not explicitly violate the rules of modernist discourse. Campesinos were
the ones who rendered this responsibility in explicitly propositional terms, who,
in Latour’s (2004) terms, became spokespeople for killer beans, even though it
meant risking disqualification from national political discourse. By 2005, as the
destructive onslaught of beans became more dire, campesinos felt forced to rescale
their interventions. Killer beans went from being a descriptive response to a local
problem to being a national proposition that demanded a national response. Anto-
nio’s question to me, an attempt at gathering practitioners, was only the precursor
to a much more dramatic intervention through the Supreme Court, meant to en-
roll the Paraguayan public as a whole and, through it, potentially the state. In this,
campesinos were in new territory and had to develop new kinds of knowledge
practices appropriate to a new scale of proposition.
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There were no good precedents for this kind of appeal to the court, but the
legalistic language that Antonio adopted was part of a more general format for
social grievances in the post–Cold War period. Since at least the late 1950s, when
General Alfredo Stroessner consolidated his dictatorship of Paraguay, the primary
apparatus for coordinating propositions into large-scale truths was the Colorado
Party, a vast patronage machine that effectively privatized the state and seeped into
every aspect of the campesino frontier (see Nickson and Lambert 2002; Turner
1993). Stroessner’s ouster in 1989 created room for vibrant national media and a
new intellectual culture led byNGOs in the capital city. But by far the largest change
was the rise of discourses around the rule of law, centered on a new constitution
and several highly publicized human rights cases (see, e.g., White 2004). Fifteen
years into the transition, campesinos knew well that in some ways legalism was a
more exclusive (and certainly more expensive) way of achieving justice than the
old system of patronage. But some campesino groups had had luck taking land
disputes to court, and Antonio knew that courts sometimes ruled in surprising
ways. As he would say, it was always worth trying for a “favorable response.” As
their grievances came to center increasingly on soybeans, it seemed an obvious step
to try to bring the law to bear on them as well.
Between 2003 and 2006, campesinos spent an immense amount of time and
resources on two cases in particular, the strict legal result of which was to find only
two people along the entire soybean chain guilty of criminal activity. Because of the
purifying processes required by the court, soybeans themselveswere not implicated
in these crimes. Nonetheless, I argue, it is these cases more than anything else in
Paraguayan politics that helped to solidify and expand soybean responsibility. This
is because although the law is restrictive in the way it assigns responsibility, the
official decision is not exhaustive of all the effects a court can have in redistributing
responsibility. Like any fact, the effectiveness of legal facts does not end with their
facticity or the sorts of meager redistribution that a court is capable of effecting.
Campesinos and their allies understood very well the point made by John Law
(2004): all facts are to some degree allegorical and are shadowed by a complexity
they cannot name.
Criminal trials are, above all, a complex system of interpretation and dis-
tillation meant to produce a certain kind of fact: a version of historical events
in which responsibility is clearly distributed (Fuller 1994) and that carries state-
backed authority within a specific territory. Although legal facts are produced in a
completely different way than scientific ones, they are similar in that they mark the
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point at which a theory of an event achieves some degree of independence from
the processes and people that produce them (Latour 2010). A proposition about
legal responsibility achieves authority in the same way that all scientific knowledge
does, by surviving what Latour (1999) calls “trials of force” in which they compete
with other theories.7 Such trials come in many different forms, of course, from
experimental repetition and peer review to political contest or judicial hearings.
But to the extent that a proposition about responsibility results in a favorable
court ruling, it, like a scientific discovery that has not been overturned, acquires a
durability that allows it to travel and enter new situations as allegories for complex
realities that are remade and reinterpreted outside the site of their production.
“This is what allegory always does,” writes Law. “It extends the fields of visibility,
and crafts new realities out-there” (2004:90). A court ruling that even implies the
relationship between soybeans and death might have the mobility and durability to
enlarge the situation in which arguments about killer soy escape disqualification.
In 2005, the first case was a response to the attack to which I’ve already
referred, when an eviction raid in a squatter colony next door to Vaquer´ıa, called
Tekojoja, ended when dozens of houses burned down and two campesinos were
killed in a drive-by shooting by soy farmers.8 Within hours of the attack, a heated
discussion began about how to respond. One group, for example, was ready to
burn down the silo that acted as the lynchpin of soy production in the area. But
Antonio eventually won out, arguing that the group should take a legal route.
Everyone knew that the process would be grueling, although I don’t think anyone
knew just how much time and energy it would absorb. They were also surprised
by how restrictively they had to frame things to appeal to the court. In the end,
the court’s interest was on a single question: had the campesinos fired on the soy
farmers first? The case turned on two primary pieces of evidence: the bullet holes
in the sides of one of the soy trucks and my pictures of the event showing that the
only weapon the campesinos were carrying was a single slingshot.
For two months, as campesinos poured in from the whole region to create
and manage a camp for those displaced by the eviction, almost all the political
efforts turned to convincing a handful of prosecutors and judges in remote cities
to distribute responsibility, among about 40 men, for a single act at a specific
place and over a period of about 20 seconds. On the surface, this seemed to
radically change the texture of campesino politics, as leaders struggled to squeeze
the sprawling complexity of soy politics through the interpretive bottleneck of the
criminal court. After several years of targeting soy as a complex and multifaceted
invader of the landscape, they moved to cutting out as many relations as possible
77
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 28:1
from the story of how themurders had taken place.Whereas before campesinos had
often represented soy farmers as the tools of soybeans, the beans had now become
irrelevant to the story, as did the eviction, the police, the silo owners, Monsanto,
the chemical effluent in the river, the history of violence and rural inequality, and
all the ways that beans had articulated these forces together. In other words, to
take their claims about soy to court, campesinos had to erase soy, and most of soy’s
allies, from their claims.
The case was dropped before going to trial. The labor of distilling back the
networks of responsibility for the destruction in Tekojoja to a fewfingers on triggers
did not result in a conviction. But the case did result in enormous media exposure
that only rarely called into doubt the responsibility of the shooters.More important,
it attracted an expanding number of allies keen to see the case as an allegory for
“la soja mata.” The deletion of actors from the story allowed for the facts of the case
to becomemore stable, to travel authoritatively in new spheres. The trial circulated
beyond the court, and stories published first in local newspapers and then online
attracted the interest of anti-GMO activists in Argentina, Spain, Holland, and
Canada, who mounted public campaigns against soybeans. These activists, far less
shy about being branded as unmodern by Paraguayan elites, descended on Paraguay
with banners, books, and websites proclaiming, “La soja mata!”9 The court had not
even considered the responsibility of soybeans, but the longer the case lingered in
the media, the more killer soy came into public focus.
It just so happened that another, more complicated case was already making
its way through the court system when the shootings happened in Tekojoja. In
January 2003, eight-year-old Silvino Talavera had died after being doused twice
with herbicides from a crop duster, and two organizations decided to mount a legal
case against his neighbors. The case dragged on through appeals, involving bribes
and payoffs, inexplicable judicial delays, and even the murder of Silvino’s uncle.
But the longer the case was delayed, the stronger the network around Silvino’s
family became. And in the aftermath of the Tekojoja episode, Silvino’s family
gathered powerful supporters, including a strong campesinowomen’s organization,
international letter writers and bloggers, skilled pro bono lawyers, and most
unusually, the first pathology lab results to circulate in Paraguay indicating that a
likely cause of death was the ingestion of agrotoxins.10 The fact of Silvino’s murder
was established through campesino voices in coordination with those of journalists,
foreigners, lawyers, scientists, and judges.
The judges in the case only halfheartedly endorsed the campesino version of
events. After four years of legal work and immense expenditure on the part of
78
BEANS BEFORE THE LAW
hundreds of people and dozens of organizations, the court responded by finding
two farmers criminally negligent and giving them two-year suspended sentences.
But far more consequential was the way the case gathered the interests of other
political actors who stood far outside the alliances that fought for the case. In 2011,
I still heard about Silvino Talavera frequently in Paraguay from people on all sides
of the soy question. And it was never a story about two nasty farmers, whose names
were never remembered. It was a story about whether soybeans, and the pesticides,
equipment, agricultural practices, and demographic changes that come with them,
could be held responsible for bad things happening to a vulnerable population. Not
everyone agrees that soy killed Silvino, but without my asking, even those who
don’t agree will bring up the case and make elaborate rationales as to why soy
doesn’t kill. The labor of distilling responsibility for the trial produced a much
more authoritative proposition, international in its reach, about the responsibility
of soy, to which many people felt the need to respond.
One of the most telling effects of these cases was the degree to which highly
placed spokespeople for soy producers began to publicly attack the campesino
version of the story. Two figures in particular gained a reputation for attacking
campesinos in national newspapers.HectorCristaldo (head of a national agricultural
producers’ organization) took to saying that campesinos had a “mental block” against
understanding soybeans as a great opportunity, and Claudia Ruser (president of the
Paraguayan Soy Association) claimed that campesino leaders were trying to start a
civil war and were using beans as a pretext (see Torres 2007). Both Cristaldo and
Ruser were still trying to disqualify campesino claims, but they were also hesitant
and defensive. The fact that they had been forced to respond showed that the
ground was shifting, and they were taking on new roles as spokespeople, not only
for soy producers, but also for soy itself.
That is a radical shift. Starting from a situation in which campesinos were
mocked for suggesting that soy was dangerous, we end up with a public debate
about the future of Paraguay in which soy is openly attacked and defended as
responsible for different effects: economic growth, national modernization, envi-
ronmental destruction, campesino impoverishment, and death. These beans did
not exist before they were enacted in and out of court, but there could be no
question of their vital importance afterward. Somewhere a new politics emerged,
in the sense meant by Jacques Rancie`re (1999:99), as a “singular disruption [of
the established] distribution of bodies.”11 By turning killer soy into a matter of
national and international concern, campesinos participated in remaking the po-
litical landscape, making the presence of beans felt, and forcing new modes of
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thinking among a wider array of actors (Stengers 2010b). This is not to say that
everyone suddenly assented to the campesino definition of soy as killer beans.
“La soja mata” didn’t become a matter of undisputed fact, but it was also not easily
disqualified. Instead it became a serious proposition in a wider dialogue of actions
and responses.
RESPONSIBLE SOY
It is tempting to celebrate the campesino movement for this shift and to see
the moment as an example of empowerment. Antonio’s response to beans was
bold, using them as a line of flight from the stifling modern territory of subjects and
objects. Through concerted effort campesinos overcame disqualification and forced
their allies and adversaries to respond to the very presences they had originally
denied existed.12 But this in no way implies a complete victory for campesinos;
indeed, following Stengers (2010b:21), we might say that what is empowered here
is the situation, rather than the actors, and this situation forces campesinos and
others to think differently. Although lines of flight are worth taking, by definition
they come with no guarantees that the point of arrival will make life easier for
people like Antonio (Stengers 2008). This is merely a chapter in a long story of
responses that calls forth new responses. There are many possible responses to
a newly recognized killer soy and an emboldened campesino movement. This is
where I believe that solidarity with Paraguayan campesinos demands a response
that is not simply a ratification.
I wonder, in fact, if the greater danger for campesinos in this new position
isn’t the temptation to use disqualification themselves. This first occurred to me
after an incident in 2009 in a community not far from Antonio’s house. A soy
farmer had signed a contract with his neighbors saying he would not plant soybeans
on a disputed plot of land. He broke the contract, and confronted by campesino
protesters, he called in the police, who looked over the agreement. “Why don’t
you plant something else?” the policeman asked him, innocently. “Why don’t you
plant corn?” The soy farmer, beside himself with frustration, threw a tantrum.
With his face twisted in rage, he yelled, “I only want to plant soy! I want to
plant soy!” before jumping in his truck and careening off down the road. The
story about the man’s breakdown circulated for weeks among my friends and
took on a familiar tone. It became a mocking story of the farmer blinded by
his love of soybeans. Why not, said the reasonable storytellers, just plant corn?
There was something disingenuous in this disqualification, and it made me wonder
whether it foreclosed other kinds of thinking that might foster, for example,
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stronger alliances between campesinos and impoverished soy producers who lived
nearby.
I had a similar reaction to the decidedly ambivalent appearance of something
calling itself “Responsible Soy” in the South American soy belt. Responsible Soy
refers to a nonbinding declaration of principles by producers that the beans will
be accompanied by reforestation efforts, fair labor practices, and a commitment to
not kill one’s neighbors, with the promise of implementing country-specific certi-
fication guidelines in the coming years.13 Activists are quick to accuse Responsible
Soy of being a greenwash and claim that the discourse of responsibility is a direct
challenge to the state, an attempt to reposition the corporate bodies in and around
the soy complex as the proper site of government in lieu of an absent regulatory
apparatus (Corporate Europe Observatory 2009). Indeed, the guidelines in most
cases amount to little more than a declaration that farmers will respect national
laws and regulations, explicitly moving the center of regulatory responsibility from
the state to corporations and to enforcement by the market. Certainly this is part
of what is going on.
But it is not the whole story. If, alongside campesinos, we respond to killer
soy—if we tie our analytic intervention to the enactment of a historically spe-
cific responsible thing—then this has consequences for how we view other soys.
Responsible Soy, an industry proposition that recognizes harm and enlists a new
form of regulation, deserves a more careful response than disqualification.14 When
I asked Antonio what he thought of Responsible Soy, I expected him to oppose
it, but I didn’t expect mockery. “I always tell people how ridiculous it is. Soy
can’t be responsible,” he said. “Soy can’t talk!” The phrase “soy can’t talk” (“soja
non˜e’e˜kuaai”) evokes a common campesino expression for lacking intelligence. It
also repeats the modern refrain, a standard kind of disqualification used to exclude
things from political and moral consideration.15 Antonio and others clearly took
pleasure in accusing soy farmers and their corporate allies of either being blind
themselves or of trying to pull one over on the world with a blatant misallocation
of agency to beans.
But who in fact wins from this new form of disqualification? When I returned
to visit Antonio in 2009, they were not all dead, as he had predicted. But some
certainly were, including Antonio’s wife of 20 years. She had died of a disease that
was entirely treatable, if not for her family’s poverty, undeniably sharpened by
beans. Others had left the countryside to flee deepening poverty and, for all intents
and purposes, ceased being campesinos. Everything he said then was tinged with
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melancholy and resignation. The same was true of his insistence that beans don’t
talk.
A less celebratory reading of this story begins by noting that the campesino
flight from themodern, like their flight from the frontier, may have been a response
forced by soybeans. On the front lines of a dramatic material transformation of the
landscape, campesinos had merely been the first to appreciate a fundamental shift
engulfing their country from the east. Their response, like all responses, was shaped
by proximity. By 2009, many more people had been touched by this presence, and
a new form of thinking had engulfed even Asuncio´n. Paraguay was now a place
full of killer beans and responsible beans, of newly flexible networks of capital,
government agents, and NGOs all unselfconsciously seeing rural development as
a form of technical negotiation with these miraculous and destructive legumes.
But far from appearing as the leaders of this negotiation, campesinos have retaken
their place as subalterns on a new terrain. My doubt now is that another form
of disqualification is emerging with a different relationship to the modern than
what Stengers warns against. Antonio’s attempts at disqualification ring hollow
and confirm another story so common among Andre´s’s friends: campesinos are
the dupes not only of superstition but of a quaint form of high modernism, the
same ideology that keeps them demanding state subsidies for cotton or keeps
them thinking that a citizen’s hard work and honesty entitles him to basic police
protections and opportunities for improvement. Only a campesino could believe
these things, the line goes, and only a campesino could believe that it was possible
to just plant corn.
ABSTRACT
This article provides an ethnographic response to the statement that soy kills (“la soja
mata”), a refrain often repeated by campesino activists living on the edge of Paraguay’s
rapidly expanding soybean frontier. In the context of Paraguay’s modernization projects
since the 1960s, statements like these were easily disqualified as irrational or nonmodern.
In the process, the political importance and analytic potential of the beans were dismissed,
and so, too, were the lives and analyses of rural activists. And yet the activists with whom
I worked managed, over the course of five years of court battles, to bring killer beans before
the courts and to have them recognized as a force in Paraguayan politics. In so doing,
they also opened up an analytic position for ethnography, allied with Isabelle Stengers’s
cosmopolitics, which emerges from a situation ofmutually enacting responses, rather than
as a mediator of relationships between beings included or excluded from the political
territory by the criteria of modernity. [legal activism, response, responsibility,
knowledge practices, modernity, human–plant relations, frontiers, agrarian
transitions, rural politics]
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1. That being said, the concept of response has also historically been used to describe inherent
capacities and to differentiate humans from nonhumans, which can only “react.” Derrida
(2002) and Haraway (2008), among others, have opened up the conception of response for
nonhuman animals.
2. Many of the authors I cite here go to some lengths to uncouple the word from its humanist
underpinnings, making it a property of any number of hybrids and quasi objects, including
humans. Barad’s (2007) notion of the “agential cut” is probably the most sophisticated version.
I am not convinced that there is anything worth salvaging from the concept of agency that
cannot be done using other, better words.
3. Barad uses the term intra-action to talk about relationships that are not the interactions of
previously existing entities but entities mutually constituted in process.
4. RRSoybeans are profitable primarily because, by resisting the herbicide glyphosate (Roundup),
they allow repeated applications and virtually eliminate the need for manual weeding.
5. The practice was common enough that the nickname “white bag,” was used across the ministry
to describe seed shipments that arrived without any information about their providence.
6. Indeed, although Paraguay failed to meet most of the conditions set by the IMF for a standby
loan in 2004, the fund nonetheless awarded the money on the basis of positive growth after a
good soy year. Economists call this kind of dependency the “resource curse” (see Berry 2010),
clearly placing responsibility on nonhumans.
7. I’m using Disch’s (2010) translation here of e´preuves de force, rather than the more common
“trials of strength,” which connotes a property rather than an active relationship.
8. See Hetherington 2011 for a detailed discussion of the land conflicts surrounding this case.
9. See www.lasojamata.net.
10. Until 2009, when the new government reformed the public health system, there was almost
no discussion about pesticide poisoning outside of the relatively frequent use of pesticides for
suicide. The Talavera case remains the only case in which blood tests were carried out to
ascertain the likelihood of poisoning.
11. This requires a slight modification of Rancie`re, who for the most part contains his version of
politics to the realm of humans (see Bennett 2010:104–107).
12. There’s a strong argument to be made that campesinos, together with soybeans, contributed
significantly to the 2008 election of the first nominally leftist government in Paraguay’s history.
13. The initiative, called the Round Table on Responsible Soy, brings together corpora-
tions and NGOs throughout the Southern Cone. In Paraguay, the organizations involved
are the World Wildlife Fund and an investment consortium called Grupo DAP. See
www.responsiblesoy.org.
14. The same goes for attempts to fortify the mixed economies of the campesino sector, to
generate more viable local food networks, and to improve value-added capacity in crops other
than soybeans that can be profitably produced by smallholders.
15. Disch (2010:271) makes this point most strongly, showing that the “mythology of voice” as
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